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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Is the defendant entitled to a new trial because trial counsel failed to remove a
member of the jury who expressed actual bias?
The standard of review for failure to remove a juror who expressed actual bias is
abuse of discretion. State v. King, 2008 UT 54, \ 12, 190 P.3d 1283 (Utah 2008).
2. Did the defendant receive ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel
failed to remove two members of the jury who expressed potential bias, either by
challenging them for cause or using a preemptory challenge?
The standard of review for failure to remove a juror who expressed potential bias
is plain error where the defendant failed to object for cause during voir dire. Id
3. Did Smith receive ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel effectively
conceded the defendant's guilt in closing argument?
It is a matter of law whether defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of
counsel. State v. EUifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App.1992).
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it failed to remove a member of the
jury who expressed actual bias and failed to rehabilitate a juror who expressed potential
bias?
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The standard of review for failure to remove a juror who expressed actual bias is
abuse of discretion and the standard of review for failure to remove a juror who
expressed potential bias is plain error. State v. King, 2008 UT 54, ^ 12, 190 P.3d 1283
(Utah2008).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The defendant, Gary Smith, was charged with two counts of Aggravated Robbery,
Count 3, Criminal Mischief; Count 4, Burglary; Count 5, Theft; Count 6, Possession of a
Dangerous Weapon by a Category II Restricted Person; Count 7, Engaging in Conduct
Likely to Harm a Police Service Dog, Counts 8 and 9, Burglary of a Vehicle, Count 10,
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and Count 11, Interference with an Arresting Officer.
(R. 1-3). After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of all counts except Count 7,
Engaging in Conduct Likely to Harm a Police Service Dog, of which he was acquitted.
(R.76-86).
The defendant was sentenced to five years to life on counts 1 and 2, each to run
consecutive to the other; one tofifteenyears on count 3 and count 5; zero tofiveyears on
count 4, one year each on count 6, count 8, and count 9, six months each on count 10 and
count 11, with counts 2 through 11 to run concurrent. (R. 90-93). Smith appealed. (R.
95-96). Trial counselfileda brief and the Statefileda Motion to Strike Appellant's
Brief, Discharge Counsel, and Appoint Qualified Appellate Counsel under Rule 38B of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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would kill her. {Id., 217, 20-25). Mark Sudweeks testified that Mr. Smith moved the
dump truck and drove the red car out of the building but it appeared to get stuck in the
snow. {Id. 169, 6-170, 15). Officer Thompson testified that when he arrived at the scene
he found Mr. Smith on the property hiding in some bushes and holding a knife in his
hand. {Id., 62, 1-11; 67, 7-9). The Officer testified that he found a metal cigarette on Mr.
Smith that smelled like marijuana. {Id. 71, 3-72, 5). The officer also testified that he
found a "meth pipe" in the glove box of the red car in the bam. {Id., 82, 8 - 83, 21). Mr.
Smith was placed under arrest and was charged with eleven counts including Aggravated
Robbery, Criminal Mischief, and Burglary.. (R. 1-3). The case went to trial on June 30,
2009.
The court summoned a jury pool of 30 persons. During voir dire, the Court asked
the jurors several questions including whether any members of the jury pool were
acquainted with members of the prosecution. (R. 116, 15, 3-5). Juror Kevin Ockey,
informed the Court that he served in a church calling with Perry Davis, one of the deputy
county attorney's from the Juab County Attorney's Office. (R. 116; 15, 6-7). In
response to the Court's inquiry whether that relationship would impact his ability to be
fair and impartial Juror Ockey responded "No." {Id. 8-11). Juror Ockey also informed
the Court that defense counsel was a client of his insurance agency. {Id. ;18, 24, - 19, 2).
In response to the Court's inquiry whether that relationship would impact his ability to be
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fair and impartial Mr. Ockey responded "No." (Id; 19,3-6).
Several members of the jury had close relatives in law enforcement. Frank
Riding's brother was a deputy in Utah County (Id.; 24, 16-17); Daniel Firkus had a
brother-in-law going through the police academy (Id.; 24, 24-25); Christine Blackhurst's
brother-in-law was a highway patrolman in California (Id.; 25,19-20); and Michelle
Stephenson's ex-boyfriend, and the father of her children, was an officer at the Utah
County Jail. (Id. 27, 22 - 28, 12). In response to the Court's inquiry whether the fact that
they had family members employed in law enforcement would cause them to give more
or less weight to the testimony of a peace officer than anyone else that that might testify
in the trial, each of the jurors responded "No." (R. 116: page 24, 11 - page 28, 15).
In response to the Court's inquiry whether they had close relationships with other
members of the jury which may cause they to give more or less weight to the opinion of
someone else that might serve on the jury with them, Juror Firkus informed the Court that
Juror Ockey, was his Bishop and that he valued his opinion although he did not think it
would really make a difference in the case. (Id.; 29, 7-9). The Court began to question
Juror Firkus concerning his potential bias but the Court was interrupted by Juror Ockey
and never completed the question. Juror Firkus never stated unequivocally that he would
not be prejudiced by the association and both he and Juror Ockey were ultimately
empaneled on the jury;
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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MR. FIRKUS: Well, Kevin is my bishop, so I do value his opinion, but I
don't think it would really make a difference that way in this case.
THE COURT: Okay. So Mr. Ockey is your ecclesiastical leader, but you
don't - - although you value his opinion, you think you could
MR. OCKEY:

He never listens to me.

THE COURT:
29,10-15).

Okay. Anyone else? How about you, Mr. Ockey? (Id;

The Court had the jurors complete a questionnaire of 22 questions which included
questions concerning personal information, whether they could read and write English;
their citizenship; if they could weight the evidence fairly and without prejudice; if they
would follow the instructions provided by the court; if there was any reason why they
could not be a fair and impartial juror or if there were any reasons or hardships why they
could not serve as a juror. (R. jury questionnaires). After receiving the responses and
giving the parties time to process them, the trial judge brought counsel into chambers and
they discussed which jurors should be removed for cause. (R. 116, 32-37). The Court
and counsel stipulated to strike several jurors for cause including Donna Jones who
attended the same church as the victims; Mr. Evans, a police officer for the state parks
who worked closely with the County Attorney's Office; Mr. Carter who had close
association with everyone and Leonard Trauntvein who had a daughter that worked for
the County Attorney's Office. (Id). Trial counsel did not request that the Court question
any of the potential jurors concerning bias. (Id.; 32, 9—37,7).
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Counsel for the State, Jared Eldridge, asked to question Christine Blackhurst
concerning her answer to question number 21; "Are there any other reasons why you
could not be a fair and impartial juror in this case?

Please explain:" (R.jury

questionnaires, 12). Juror Blackhurst had stated; "I do teach FHE every Monday night at
the Juab Co. Jail. I don't know if that would be a problem in this case" (Id):
MR. ELDRIDGE: You know, Christine Blackhurst, I kind of wanted to ask her
a question. She indicated she does family home evening out at the jail, and I just
wondered if - - she didn't indicate that she knew defendant, but I just wondered if
she sat on this jury and found him guilty if that was going to make her
uncomfortable out there at the jail.
THE COURT:

Do you want her brought in?

THE COURT:

Yeah, why don't you move (inaudible).

MR.ELDRIDGE: I'll just shift down one.
(Ms. Blackhurst enters chambers)
MR. ELDRIDGE:

Hi there. Are you nervous?

MS. BLACKHURST:

Yeah.

THE COURT: Ms. Blackhurst, you indicated in your questionnaire that you
conducted family home evenings out at the jail.
MS. BLACKHURST:
THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

Mr. Eldridge might have had a question for you.

MR. ELDRIDGE: Right. I was just - - you don't know this particular defendant
in your involvement out there; is that right?
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MS. BLACKHURST:
MR.ELDRIDGE:

Youjust don't know?

MS. BLACKHURST:
MR.ELDRIDGE:

I--

I don't know him. I --

Okay.

MS. BLACKHURST:
only thing of- -

I'm not sure if he came one time or not, and that's the

MR. ELDRIDGE: My question is is (sic) if you sat on this jury and the evidence
was such that you thought that he was guilty and you found him guilty, would that
make you uncomfortable out there at the jail working with the people that you
work with?
MS. BLACKHURST:
MR. ELDRIDGE:

That was my question.

MS. BLACKHURST:
THE COURT:
MR. HARMON:

I don't think so.

Okay

Anything else, Mr. Harmon? ,
No. (R. 116, 32, 24-34, 11).

Although Juror Blackhurst, answered "no" to question number 19; "Do you feel that you
can weigh the evidence fairly and without prejudice?" trial counsel did not ask Juror
Blackhurst any questions, nor did he ask the Court to rehabilitate her concerning her
responses on the juror questionnaire. (R. Juror questionnaires, no 12). No further
questions were addressed to Juror Blackhurst by either trial counsel or the Court
concerning her answer that she could not weight the evidence fairly and without
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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prejudice. Jurors Blackhurst, Firkus and Ockey all served on the jury together with
Jurors Riding, Stephenson, Miller, Whiting, and Stephensen. Trial counsel passed the
jury. (Id; 37,7).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in this case as he failed to
challenge a juror who had expressed actual bias, failed to challenge two jurors who had
expressed implied bias, failed to subject the State's case to an aggressive testing and
conceded the defendant's guilt during closing argument. Prejudice can be presumed
because one member of the jury expressed actual bias and the State's case was not
subjected to the adversarial testing required by the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel. The trial court erred by failing to ensure that the defendant was
judged by a fair and impartial jury.
Even if the Court should find that the juror's expressed bias was not sufficient to rise
to the level of actual bias, the cumulative effect of the several errors by trial counsel in
selecting the jury and throughout the trial demonstrates that Mr. Smith did not receive a
fair trial.
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ARGUMENT
I.

TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO ENSURE THAT THE JURY WAS
IMPARTIAL

To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel
rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment. State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998); see also Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). There is generally also a second requirement
that the defendant demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for the deficient conduct
he would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638,
644 (Utah 1996). However there are some situations where trial counsel's performance is
such that the Court has found that prejudice can be presumed as the defendant has been
denied his basic sixth amendment rights that make the adversary process itself
presumptively unreliable. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).
1. Prejudice under Strickland is presumed when a biased juror is impaneled and a
new trial is required.
In United States v. Cronic, decided the same day as Strickland, the Court explained
that when circumstances are so likely to prejudice the defendant, the cost of litigating
their effect is unjustified, and prejudice can be presumed. 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). A
defendant is spared the need to show probable effect upon the outcome, and simply
presume such effect, where assistance of counsel is denied during a critical stage of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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proceeding. Strickland 466 U.S. at 692; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523 (UT
1994). "When that has occurred, the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high
that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166
(2002). Whether a litigant is required to show actual prejudice or whether prejudice is
instead presumed "turns on the magnitude of the deprivation of the right to effective
assistance of counsel." Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, If 100, 150 P.3d 480. One of the
areas recognized by the Courts where prejudice can be presumed is when a defendant has
established that a member of the jury has exhibited actual bias. State v. King, (King IV)
2008 UT 54, TI28, Tl 36, 190 P.3d 1283 (Utah 2008).
The seating of a biased juror who should have been dismissed for cause requires
reversal of the conviction. United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316 (2000).
The question of whether to seat a biased juror is not a discretionary or strategic decision.
United States v. Hughes, 258 F.3d 453, 463 (6th Cir.2001). "When trial counsel impanels
a biased juror, prejudice under Strickland is presumed, and a new trial is required."
Miller v. Webb, 385 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2004). The "presence of a biased juror cannot be
harmless; the error requires a new trial without a showing of actual prejudice." United
States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000).
The question of whether to seat a biased juror is not a discretionary or strategic
decision as it undermines the fairness and impartiality of the verdict. A defendant who is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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convicted of a crime by a jury comprised of even one member who has exhibited actual
bias is entitled to a new trial as it is the only way to assure that a defendant's rights under
the Sixth Amendment are preserved.
2. Actual bias can be demonstrated by an express admission of bias during voir dire
"Actual bias is 'bias in facf-the existence of a state of mind that leads to an
inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality." United States v. Torres,
128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997)(citing United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936;/
Actual prejudice is demonstrated when a juror makes a "clear declaration that she did not
think she could be a fair juror." United States v. Hughes, 258 F.3d 453, 458 (6th
Cir.2001).
In Hughes, the Sixth Circuit found that a juror had expressed actual bias and the
defendant had to receive a new trial as prejudice was presumed. Id. During voir dire, the
trial judge asked potential jurors whether they thought they could be fair. Id. 258 F.3d at
456. In response, one of the jurors indicated that she had a nephew on the police force,
was familiar with several detectives and stated: "I don't think I could be fair." Id. Neither
the court nor trial counsel asked the potential juror any follow-up questions, and "failed
to conduct the most rudimentary inquiry of the potential juror to inquire further into her
statement that she could not be fair." Id. at 458-459. The Sixth Circuit found that juror
bias can always be presumed from such an unequivocal statement. Id. at 460. The Court
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also found that a failure of trial counsel to respond to a prospective juror's express
admission of bias on voir dire, was a failure to exercise the customary skill and diligence
that a reasonably competent attorney would provide. Id. at 754.
In another case the Sixth Circuit Court ruled that prejudice could be presumed in a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel failed to challenge for cause
a juror who knew a witness and had expressed sympathy for her. Miller v. Webb, 385
F.3d 666 (2004). The Court ruled that the presence of a biased juror could not be
harmless. Id. at 678. During voir dire, a juror stated that she knew the state's key witness
who was the only eyewitness to the crime and who had also been shot. Id. at 668. The
juror explained that she knew the witness through her ministry and Bible Study Group in
the local jail. Id. She stated she would be "partial" to the witness and had sympathy for
her. Id. at 668-669. While she stated that she "believed" she could be fair, she qualified
this by stating, "I do have some feelings about her." Id. at 669. Counsel did not followup with questions or challenge the juror. Id. The Court found that "the decision whether
to seat a biased juror cannot be a discretionary or strategic decision" because it amounts
to "a waiver of a defendant's basic Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury."
/</. at 675-676.
The selection of an impartial jury depends heavily upon counsel's participation
and vigilance in detecting possible biases. A defendant may rebut the presumption that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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their trial counsel's decisions in choosing a jury were the result of plausibly justifiable
conscious choices. The defendant needs to show that trial counsel was so inattentive
during the jury selection process that he failed to remove a prospective juror who had
expressed a bias so strong or unequivocal that no plausibly countervailing subjective
preference could justify failure to remove that juror. See Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, <J
25, 156 P. 3d 739 (Utah 2007). Trial counsel in this case failed to uphold the defendant's
right to trial by an impartial jury by failing to follow-up on the actual bias expressed by
one jury member and the potential bias of several other members of the jury.
3. Juror Blackhurst expressed actual bias and should have been removed from the
jury
Evaluating trial counsel's jury selection decisions can be a speculative exercise;
however, the key facts are easily discernible in relation to Juror Blackhurst in this case.
On her questionnaire, Juror Blackhurst took the unusual step of expressly stating an
inability to weigh the evidence without prejudice when she answered "no" to question
number 19; "Do you feel that you can weigh the evidence fairly and without prejudice?'9
(R. Juror questionnaire, no. 12). Even when Juror Blackhurst was brought into chambers
to be questioned by the State concerning her written answer to question number 21, trial
counsel still did not ask her any questions concerning her negative reply to question 19.

MR. ELDRIDGE: Right. I was just - - you don't know this particular defendant
in your involvement out there; is that right?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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MS. BLACKHURST:
MR.ELDRIDGE:

Youjust don't know?

MS. BLACKHURST:
MR.ELDRIDGE:

I--

I don't know him. I - -

Okay.

MS. BLACKHURST:
only thing of- -

I'm not sure if he came one time or not, and that's the

MR. ELDRIDGE: My question is is (sic) if you sat on this jury and the evidence
was such that you thought that he was guilty and you found him guilty, would that
make you uncomfortable out there at the jail working with the people that you
work with?
MS. BLACKHURST:
MR. ELDRIDGE:

That was my question.

MS. BLACKHURST:
THE COURT:

I don't think so.

Okay

Anything else, Mr. Harmon?

MR.HARMON:

No. (116; 33, 19- 34, 11).

A clear expression of an inability to weight the evidence "fairly and without
prejudice" is an unusual enough occurrence injury selection to generally attract the
attention of trial counsel if they are diligent and attentive. Throughout voir dire in this
case, when given the opportunity, trial counsel did not ask any questions to collect
information about any of the prospective jurors. Although Juror Blackhurst expressed
her bias so unequivocal that no plausible countervailing subjective preference could
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justify failure to remove her, trial counsel did not challenge her for cause or use a
preemptory challenge to remove her from the jury.
Juror Blackhurst meets the definition of a biased juror as she admitted in her
questionnaire that she could not weight the evidence fairly and without prejudice and she
was never rehabilitated as to this admission. Since seating a biased juror cannot be a
discretionary or strategic decision because it amounts to a waiver of a defendant's basic
Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury, trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel. He failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a
reasonably competent attorney would provide. As Juror Blackhurst admitted that she
could not act with entire impartiality, actual prejudice is presumed, and the requirements
of Strickland and Cronic have been met.
4. Juror Firkus and Juror Ocker expressed an implied bias and should have been
removed from the jury
To establish that trial counsel was inattentive, a defendant must demonstrate either
"a specific and clear example of inattentiveness that directly caused the failure to object
to a particular juror, or else show that counsel generally failed to participate in a
meaningful way in the process as a whole.'1 State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, 153
P.3d 804 (2006)(quoting at State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,120, 12 P.3d 92). Justice
O'Connor has given some examples of situations where bias may be presumed: "a
revelation that theDigitized
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criminal transaction, or that the juror was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal
transaction." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 (1982) (concurring opinion). Justice
O'Connor explained that seating close relatives of the prosecutor on the jury would
introduce "an extraneous influence that could color the deliberations" as it would be
highly unlikely that an individual could remain impartial and objective when a blood
relative has a stake in the outcome. Id. "The juror in question would be lacking the
quality of indifference which, along with impartiality, is the hallmark of an unbiased
juror." Id.
In addition to failing to notice that Juror Blackhurst had expressed an inability to hear
the case without prejudice, trial counsel was also ineffective by failing to question either
Juror Firkus or Juror Ockey concerning undue influence in the jury after Juror Firkus
disclosed to the Court that Juror Kevin Ockey was in a fiduciary position over him as his
religious leader. The record indicates that trial counsel was completely inattentive to the
answers the jurors were giving during voir dire, particularly Juror Firkus. Trial counsel
failed to note that Juror Firkus failed to answer the Court's question concerning whether
he could express his own opinion as to the case and not give any more weight to
someone's else's opinion.
MR. FIRKUS;
Well, Kevin is my bishop, so I do value his opinion, but I
don't think it would really make a difference that way in this case.
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THE COURT;
Okay. So Mr. Ockey is your ecclesiastical leader, but you
don't - - although you value his opinion, you think you could
MR. OCKEY:

He never listens to me.

THE COURT:

Okay. Anyone else. How about you Mr. Ockey.

Juror Ockey further revealed that many of the potential jurors were his business
associates or long time acquaintances, demonstrating that he had a potential for influence
on many of the jury members. (R., 29, 16-18). When the Court further questioned
whether any of those relationships came together socially or anything, Juror Ockey's
answer was somewhat evasive:
MR. OCKEY:
There's plenty in this room that either I associate with
through my business or been long time acquaintances, lived - - growing up and living in
this community.
THE COURT:
socially or anything?
MR.OCKEY:

Anyone that has a strong relationship that you come together
No, not really, yes.

THE COURT:

You don't think there's any relationship such that

MR. OCKEY:

Would affect me, no, sir. (R. 116, 29, 7-24).

Trial counsel was ineffective and inattentive by failing to notice that the Court's
question concerning the potential for undue influence addressed to Juror Ferkus was
answered by Juror Ockey and Juror Firkus failed to answer the question. Had trial
counsel been attentive or actively engaged in the selection process, he would have noted
the Court's oversight
and
given
Court
opportunity
toLaw
correct
it when the parties
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retired to chambers. However trial counsel did not request any further query concerning
the potential bias and appeared to be totally unaware that Juror Firkus had never been
rehabilitated. The only challenge for cause trial counsel made on his own initiative was
for Mr. Hall who indicated that he had a funeral to arrange. (R. 116, 35, 11-12). All
other challenges were suggested by the Court or the State. (Id. 32-36). In chambers trial
counsel's discussion on removing potential jurors for cause focused more on his concern
for the potential members of the jury than on his role as trial counsel for the defendant.
(R. 116, 35, 12- 36, 9). Effective trial counsel must investigate juror bias through facts,
not speculation. Juror Kevin Ockey had informed the court that he served in a close
religious position with the deputy attorney for Juab County, he was the ecclesiastical
leader of Juror Firkus and that he was closely acquainted with most of the members of the
jury pool through his business. The fact that Juror Ockey was elected to be the jury
foreman lends credibility to his claim that he was close to most of the members of the
jury pool. Trial counsel did not ask Juror Firkus any further questions concerning
whether or not he would be influenced by having his ecclesiastical leader serve on the
same jury with him or whether he felt like his decision making process would be affected
by his connection to the bishop. He did not ask Juror Ockey any further questions
concerning his relationship to Perry Davis, one of the prosecutor's from the county
attorney's office, how long he had known him or the nature of the church calling they had
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served in together. (R. 116, 15, 6-11). Although Juror Ockey had expressed that his
relationship with Mr. Davis would not impact his ability to be fair and impartial, jurors
are not always the best judge of how their relationships will impact their decision making
process. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to ask Juror
Ockey questions specifically relating to his ability to be fair in light of his working
relationship with one of the prosecutors; by failing to question Juror Firkus concerning
his close relationship with Juror Ockey and because he failed to even raise the issue of
challenging them for cause or removing them from the jury by means of his preemptory
challenges. Trial counsel was so inattentive or indifferent that the failure to remove the
jurors was not the product of a conscious choice or preference, but rather that he went
along with whatever the Court and the State suggested.
II.

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE WHEN HE FAILED TO
SUBJECT THE STATE'S CASE TO A MEANINGFUL TEST AND
WHEN HE CONCEDED SMITH'S GUILT IN CLOSING ARGUMENT.
Trial counsel must subject the prosecution's case to adversarial challenge in order

to ensure that the accused receives the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment. To be effective, an attorney "must play the role of an active
advocate, rather than a mere friend of the court." Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394
(1985). If the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the
constitutional guarantee
is violated. "[I]f counsel entirely fails to subject the
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prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth
Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable."
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. Unless an attorney represents the interests of a client with zeal
and loyalty, the adversarial system of justice cannot operate. State v. Holland, 876 P.2d
357, 359 (Utah 1994)(citing Cronic 466 U.S. at 656-57). A Court can presume that
ineffective assistance of counsel was prejudicial when trial counsel entirely "fails to
subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." Kelt v. State, 2008 UT
62, f 32, 194 P.3d 913 (Utah 2008). (Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659).
Trial counsel did not subject the State's case to the adversarial challenge necessary
to guarantee Smith's right to a fair trial. Although he subjected the State's witnesses to
cross- examination, his representation fell below the standard required from competent
counsel. He failed to raise numerous objections, he did not require the State to meet its
burden of proof with regards to the alleged paraphernalia that was found on Mr. Smith or
his possession or ownership of the red vehicle located inside the bam and in closing
argument he conceded Smith's guilt.
The State must introduce evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged
crime. See State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Trial counsel failed to object when Officer Thompson discussed a key piece of
evidence he claimed to have located on Mr. Smith's person that linked Smith to
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ownership of the red car located inside the barn even though the document was not
produced at trial. Under Rule 1002 of the Utah Rules of Evidence the document needed
to be produced in court and put into evidence in order to be presented to the jury.
MR. ELDRIDGE: Okay. During your investigation were you ever able to find
who the owner of this vehicle was?
OFFICER THOMPSON: Not necessarily. He had in his possession just a piece
of paper like a legal pad like you guys are writing on, he'd ripped off the corner and it
said, "I so-and-so sell this Pathfinder to Mr. Smith for" - 1 can't remember, a hundred
bucks or something. It wasn't a lot. I can't remember what it was. We ran the - - it had
a temporary plate on the back, and the name on his bill of sale, I guess, was the same
name that came back to the temporary stickers on it, and I've never been able to locate
him yet, or find a registered owner.
Q.
So you indicate you found a piece of paper or a writing in the
possession of the defendant; is that right?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Okay. Do we have that?

A.
I'm not sure where it is. I think it got sealed. I think it actually was
left in the glove box or something so we wouldn't lose it at the time. I can't remember if
we got it into evidence or not, because I was still doing research and searching trying to
find that other person.
MR. ELDREDGE: All right. I think those are all the questions that I'm going
to ask Officer Thompson at this time. (R. 116, 103, 24 - 104, 16).
Trial counsel also failed to object when Officer Thompson estimated the damage to the
property, an element of Count 3, Criminal Mischief, even though the Officer was not
qualified as an expert and clearly stated that he was in no way a professional estimator
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and that there was so much damage he could not give a good estimate. (Id. 134, 11-135,
2). Under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, if specialized knowledge will assist
the jury to understand the evidence, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Although Officer Thompson claimed that as a police officer he made estimations of
damage to property, trial counsel did not object or raise any question concerning his
training or experience that qualified him to make estimations of damage to property,
vehicles or electronic equipment.
Trial counsel also permitted the Officer to testify, without objection, that the pipe
located in the vehicle contained meth and the metal cigarette found on Mr. Smith's
person contained marijuana. (R. 116, 71, 1-72, 5). He did not require the State to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the grain that the officer described as "burnt tobacco" was
marijuana by introducing any tests performed at the State Lab by experts, but rather
permitted the Officer to testify as an expert based only on his sense of smell. Id. Trial
counsel further permitted the Officer to testify without objection, that the pipe he located
in the glove compartment of the red vehicle was a "meth pipe." This was based solely on
the Officer's experience of seeing other similar pipes that had been used to smoke meth.
(Id. 83, 9-25). Trial counsel permitted the pipe to be published to the jury as Exhibit 9
without requiring any testing of the pipe for residue by an expert. Id.
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Before trial Smith had entered not guilty pleas to all eleven (11) charges against
him. (R. 22). In closing argument, trial counsel asked the jury to find his client guilty of
Criminal Mischief and conceded that Smith had committed burglary and theft:
Sometimes we can't discover truth. What you've got to do is do
the best you can with the evidence that's been presented to you. What
we would do is ask you tofindMr. Smith guilty, but just of the 3rd
Degree Felony, and I think the best one is the criminal mischief charge.
It seems to me like many of the burglary charges and the theft
charges and all that tie in with - •• mostly with the criminal mischief
because as the items are taken out and they're saying there was all this
damage done when that occurred, it seems like that all ought to be part
of that. That's what he's asking that he be found guilty of that charge
of criminal mischief and not these other charges. That's the position
that he takes, and that's the request that he makes of you today.
Thank you. (R. 117, 163,7-20).
By conceding at least partial guilt in the closing argument trial counsel overrode Smith's
plea of not guilty and made what was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. Even if
trial counsel thought the evidence was so overwhelming that a plea of guilty to the lesser
charge of criminal mischief was the best trial strategy, he could not do so without his
client's express consent. When trial counsel admitted Smith's guilt in closing argument,
Smith's rights to a fair trial and to put the State to the burden of proof were denied.
Prejudice should be presumed in this case because failure to submit the prosecution's
charges to adversarial testing is a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ENSURE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT
TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY

Even when trial counsel fails to raise a for-cause challenge to a prospective juror,
a trial court has a duty to further investigate or remove the juror sua sponte if he or she
has ,fexpress[ed] a bias or conflict of interest so strong or unequivocal as to inevitably
taint the trial process." State v. King, (King II) 2006 UT 3, f 19, 131 P.3d 202 (UT
2006)(quoting State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 32, 12 P.3d 92 (Utah 2000)). "Once
statements are made during voir dire that' facially raise a question of partiality or
prejudice, an abuse of discretion occurs unless the challenged juror is removed by the
court or unless the court or counsel investigates further and finds the inference rebutted.5"
State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, |27, 24 P.3d 948 (Utah 2001) (quoting State v Bishop, 753
P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988). Once strong feelings of actual bias are revealed "a
prospective juror may not sit, even if the prospective juror later asserts that he or she can
render an impartial verdict." State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 449 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(Bench, J., dissenting). ff[W]hen a juror has expressed an attitude indicating prejudice or
bias, such cannot be attenuated by the juror's determination that he can render an
impartial verdict. The juror cannot be the judge of his qualifications; this function is the
responsibility of the trial court." State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981).
Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the
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to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen. Smith v. Phillips, 455 US
209, 217 (1982). More is at stake than the rights of petitioner; "justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice." Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
The Court's failure to note that Juror Blackhurst had answered on her
questionnaire that she could not weigh the evidence fairly and without prejudice meant
that defendant was denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury. (R. Juror
questionnaire, no. 12). Once Juror Firkus informed the Court during voir dire that one of
the other jurors was his ecclesiastical leader, a question of partiality or prejudice was
raised. The Court abused its discretion by permitting Juror Ockey, the religious leader, to
answer on behalf of Juror Firkus. By failing to follow up on the question to Juror Firkus
concerning whether he could express his own opinion as to the case and not give any
more weight to someone's else's opinion, the Court failed to rehabilitate Juror Firkus.
IV.

THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE NUMEROUS ERRORS WAS
HARMFUL TO DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL

Even if no harm was caused by the trial council's errors individually, the combined
effect of those errors was so harmful that Mr. Smith's conviction should be reversed
under the cumulative error doctrine. Under the cumulative error doctrine, the Court
should reverse a verdict if "the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our
confidence ... that a fair trial was had." Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801
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P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990); accord State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1146 (Utah 1989).
In assessing a claim of cumulative error, the Court should consider all the identified
errors, as well as any errors the Court assumes may have occurred. State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993).
Trial counsel's failure to ensure an impartial jury by permitting one juror who had
expressed actual bias and one juror who had implied a bias to sit on the jury combined
with his failure to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing and his
concession during closing argument that his client was guilty, taken together, resulted in
the defendant being denied his constitutional right to a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests that this Court find
that the errors committed by the trial court were prejudicial to the defendant's right to a
fair trial and reverse and remand for a new trial.
DATED | U August 2011.
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ADDENDUM
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U. S. CONST. AMEND. VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
UTAH CONST. ART. I, SEC. 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as
defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for expert
testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or methods underlying the
testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon
sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case.
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the principles or
methods on which such knowledge is based, including the sufficiency of facts or data and
the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the
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Rule 1002. Requirement of original.
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing,
recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of this State or by Statute.
Rule 1004. Admissibility of other evidence of contents.
The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a writing, recording, or
photograph is admissible if:
(1) Originals lost or destroyed. All originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the
proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith; or
(2) Original not obtainable. No original can be obtained by any available judicial process
or procedure; or
(3) Original in possession of opponent. At a time when an original was under the control
of the party against whom offered, that party was put on notice, by the pleadings or
otherwise, that the content would be a subject of proof at the hearing, and that party does
not produce the original at the hearing; or
(4) Collateral matters. The writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related to a
controlling issue.
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